ESSENTIAL PILLARS OF THE NEXT ANGLOPHONE CONFERENCE
The historical record of the All Anglophone Conferences (AAC I in Buea, 1993, and AAC II in Bamenda, 1994) is often presented as a story of unity and resistance. But a closer, more critical reading reveals a deeper flaw - one that helps explain why these gatherings, despite their scale and symbolism, failed to produce lasting outcomes.
From the outset, the conferences framed the Anglophone problem primarily as a constitutional and existential question - federalism or independence - rather than as a social, economic, and internal cohesion challenge. The Buea Declaration called for a return to a two-state federation, and the Bamenda Declaration escalated this by threatening independence. While these positions may have reflected genuine frustrations, they also shifted the focus away from the immediate and practical needs of Anglophones: unity among themselves, coexistence with Francophones, and collective development.
This emphasis on political status - federation versus independence - came at a cost. It created ideological divisions within the Anglophone community itself. Not all Anglophones shared the same appetite for secessionist rhetoric, yet the conferences increasingly leaned in that direction. Instead of consolidating a broad, inclusive Anglophone identity, they amplified fractures: moderates versus hardliners, federalists versus separatists. In doing so, they undermined the very unity they claimed to promote.
Even more critically, the conferences failed to articulate a concrete development agenda. There was little serious discussion about economic empowerment, infrastructure, education, or institutional capacity within Anglophone regions. The implicit assumption seemed to be that political restructuring alone would automatically resolve marginalization. But history shows that political form, without a development strategy, rarely delivers meaningful change. As a result, the conferences produced declarations - but not roadmaps.
Another uncomfortable truth is that these conferences became platforms for political posturing. Many of those who championed them gained visibility, legitimacy, and influence, both domestically and internationally. Yet this visibility did not translate into tangible gains for ordinary Anglophones. The rhetoric of "self-determination" often outpaced genuine efforts to achieve it. Instead of building sustained movements, institutions, or negotiation frameworks, the momentum dissipated after each conference, leaving behind symbolism rather than substance.
In this sense, the failure of the AACs was not only due to state repression or government inaction - though those were real factors - but also due to internal misdirection. By prioritizing high-stakes political outcomes like independence, and by allowing leadership ambitions to overshadow collective strategy, the conferences lost sight of more achievable and unifying goals.
If there is to be another All Anglophone Conference, its agenda must be fundamentally rethought.
First, its primary goal should be development, not grievance. Marginalization is real, but it should not be the organizing principle. The focus must shift toward building economic strength, improving education, fostering entrepreneurship, and creating opportunities for the younger generation.
Second, it must prioritize unity among Anglophones, not division. This means creating space for diverse perspectives - federalists, decentralists, and even those comfortable within the current system - without forcing a single ideological line.
Third, the conference should promote coexistence, not separation. Anglophones and Francophones are bound by geography and history. The challenge is not to undo that reality, but to make it work better through mutual respect, inclusion, and shared national purpose.
Fourth, the emphasis should be on participation in governance and equitable economic sharing, rather than abstract constitutional battles. How do Anglophones gain meaningful representation? How do they access and benefit from national resources? These are the questions that matter in everyday life.
Finally, the call should be to free political prisoners and restore civic trust, not to negotiate for appointments or elite inclusion. The legitimacy of any future conference will depend on whether it speaks for the people - or for the ambitions of a few.
In short, the next All Anglophone Conference must abandon the politics of symbolism and confrontation, and embrace the harder, more necessary work of unity, development, and shared progress. Without that shift, it risks repeating the same cycle: loud declarations, fleeting attention, and lasting disappointment.
Dr. David Makongo